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I. Jurisdiction 
U.S. Bank does not dispute the jurisdiction of this Court in connection with the 
appeal of Plaintiff and Appellant Stephanie Reynolds ("Appellant"). 
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II. Statement of the Issue 
Did the District Court properly dismiss Appellee and Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A. 
("U.S. Bank") based on the law of the case doctrine? 
Standard of Review: '"A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss based upon 
the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint[ ] presents a question of law that we review for 
correctness."' Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29 | 10, 232 P.3d 
999, 1004 (Utah 2010) (quoting Walker v. Stowell 2009 UT 82 ^ 7, 227 P.3d 242, 243 
(Utah 2009)). "In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, we 'accept the plaintiffs description of facts alleged in the complaint to be 
true.'" Id (quoting Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1979)). "Furthermore, 'it is 
well established that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,' even if it 'differs from 
that stated by the trial court.'" Id. (quoting First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 
2002UT 56^11, 52 P.3d 1137, 1139). 
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III. Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case: This case requires the Court to determine whether the 
Distfiel! <'ourl properly pmnted U.S. Bank s motion lo j'i; iniiss,, which was grounded in 
the doctrine ol the law of the case. The District Court had previously dismissed other 
defendants, all of whom had substantially greater involvement in the contested 
foreclosi ire pi oceedmgs I IS 1 Jank, fcn * coi ltr ast, 1 leld a first-position deed of trust and 
never completed foreclosure proceedings relative to the si ib ject property I I S Bank's 
loan was full) satisfied by co-defendant/appellee Corlene Kemker Trust (the "Kemker 
1 ru : ho as the highest bidder, purchased the subject property at the foreclosure sale 
v^ -o\r h- uidiinl appellee ( 'ilihank Federal IM\\\\ r Hani* Mlaum: JisniisM'd 
co-defendants based on a sound interpretation and application of relevant Utah law, the 
District Court properly granted U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss in accordance with the law 
of the case doctrine. • • •'• - ' ' ; 
Course of Proceedings: ' " following Is a si in iiiiai y of the ::oi irse of 
proceedings, but only that which is relevant to U.S. Bank's involvement in the case. 
1. On November oo^ Vppellant (as Plaintiff) filed a Complaint in the 
Third Districl G >i irt , Sail I i ike G :a till > I Jl \ ih, i is Ci v il N > 09091962 1 (R \ mil Ill ) 
2. On December 49 2009, Appellant filed an Amended Complaint. (R. at 20.) 
3 Oil March 1, 2010, Appellant filed a Request for Entry of Default as against 
U.S Ba nk. which had nc t ans w e t: ed 1 he \ mei ided Complaii it (R at 327 ) 
\. On February 2, 2010, the District Court filed a Minute Eiil :n > \ :n irsi i i int 1 .( » 
which the court granted a motion U> dismiss lluii 1I;K1 been filed b) Co-
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defendant/Appellee James H. Woodall. (R. at 218.) The court's reasoning was that 
because the beneficiary under the second-position deed of trust had, in the Substitution of 
Trustee, ratified and confirmed actions taken by the new trustee prior to the recording of 
that instrument, "the plaintiff cannot establish that Woodall lacked the authority to 
conduct the foreclosure sale or that the sale was invalid because it was conducted prior to 
the Substitution of Trustee being recorded." (R. at 219.) 
4. On March 16, 2010, U.S. Bank filed a Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Entry 
of Default Against U.S. Bank and for Leave to File Answer, which included U.S. Bank's 
proposed Answer (the "Motion to Set Aside"). (R. at 361.) 
5. On April 23, 2010, the Court filed an order granting in full U.S. Bank's 
Motion to Aside, including the request for leave to file an answer. (R. at 420.) As noted 
above, U.S. Bank's Answer was already on file with the court. 
6. On September 9, 2010, U.S. Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint, together with a supporting memorandum. (R. at 474.) 
7. On December 13, 2010, the Court heard oral argument regarding, among 
other things, U.S. Bank's Motion to Dismiss. The Court granted U.S. Bank's motion and 
directed U.S. Bank's counsel to prepare an appropriate order. (R. at 588.) 
8. On January 7, 2011, the Court filed an Order Granting U.S. Bank, NA's 
Motion to Dismiss (the "Dismissal Order"). (R. at 604.) 
9. On February 4, 2011, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. at 608.) 
10. On February 7, 2011, Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (R. at 
610.) 
4 
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Disposition at Trial Court: The District Court dismissed the Amended 
Complaint as against U.S. Bank. 
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IV. Relevant Facts 
For purposes of this appeal, U.S. Bank does not dispute the statement of facts 
provided by Appellee. 
6 
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V. Summary of Argument 
Appellant's brief fails to identify any error, either procedural or legal, in the order 
dismissing U.S. Bank from the litigation. Nowhere does Appellant discuss, analyze, or 
even mention the law of the case doctrine, which was the basis on which the District 
Court granted U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss. Nowhere does the brief provide relevant 
authority supporting any theory that would justify the reversal of the District Court's 
order of dismissal granted in favor of U.S. Bank. Accordingly, because Appellant fails to 
present any kind of argument as to why the District Court's order dismissing U.S. Bank 
should be reversed, the order must stand. 
Even if Appellant had presented an argument against U.S. Bank or its dismissal in 
its brief, the order of dismissal should nevertheless be permitted to stand because the 
foundation of Appellant's case, if any, lies in the alleged wrongfulness of the conduct of 
parties other than U.S. Bank. To the extent necessary for U.S. Bank to take a position on 
the allegedly wrongful conduct of parties other than U.S. Bank regarding the foreclosure 
proceedings that form the basis of this case, U.S. Bank joins in the arguments made by 
such parties regarding the principle of ratification, as mandated under applicable Utah 
statutory law. 
7 
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VI. Argument 
A. APPELLANT'S BRIEF FAILS TO CHALLENGE THE BASIS ON WHICH 
THE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSED U.S. BANK. ACCORDINGLY, THE 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL SHOULD STAND. 
The Dismissal Order describes the District Court's reasoning supporting the 
dismissal as follows: "The Court grants this motion to dismiss on the ground that the 
proper application of the law of the case doctrine, in conjunction with the prior rulings of 
the Court in this case, requires the dismissal of all claims asserted against defendant U.S. 
Bank,NA."(R.at605Tf3.) 
Appellant's brief does not identify the law of the case doctrine as an issue 
requiring review, let alone provide a reasoned analysis supported by appropriate 
authority, that would supply any basis for this Court to overturn the Dismissal Order. 
Without challenging—or even mentioning—the reasoning of the Dismissal Order, 
Appellant leaves it to the Court to conduct its own research and furnish its own 
arguments as to why the Dismissal Order should be reviewed, let alone reversed. This is 
improper, and hence the Dismissal Order is outside the scope of this appeal. See, e.g., 
Pasquin v. Pasquin, 988 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("'Issues not briefed by an 
appellant are deemed waived and abandoned.'") (quoting American Towers Ass'n v. CCI 
Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996)). 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant's brief to "contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, . . . with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and part of the record relied on." Utah R. App. Proc. 
24(a)(9). "An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall analysis of the issue is so 
8 
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lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court/" Smith v. 
Smith, 995 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998)). While Appellant's brief as a whole does contain analysis of the issues 
it identifies for review, it is entirely silent as to the issue regarding the District Court's 
application of the law of the case doctrine. In fact, the issue is not even raised by 
Appellant for review by the Court. Thus, Appellant's brief impermissibly "shift[s] the 
burden of research and argument" to this Court, id, and falls short of the briefing 
standard relative to preservation of issues for review set by Rule 24 in relationship to the 
Dismissal Order. 
Because Appellant has failed to raise or provide any analysis of the issue that 
formed the basis of the District Court's order dismissing U.S. Bank, the order must be 
allowed to stand. 
B. ALL OF THE CONDUCT ADDRESSED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
INVOLVES PARTIES OTHER THAN U.S. BANK, WHICH NEVER 
COMPLETED FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. HENCE, THE DISMISSAL ORDER 
SHOULD STAND. 
The entire basis of Appellant's appeal is that the foreclosure proceedings 
conducted on behalf of co-defendant/appellee Citibank Federal Savings Bank (the 
"Second-Position Lender"), the lender holding a second-position deed of trust against the 
subject property (the "Second Mortgage"), were inadequate or illegal under Utah law. 
Appellant summarizes the core of her argument as follows: 
An oral substitution of trustee violates the Statute of Frauds, 
and is a nullity. Substitution of a trustee long after the fact 
cannot validate actions taken by a person not then the trustee. 
9 
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A written substitution of trustee not recorded at the time of 
filing a Notice of Default is ineffective. Notices filed in such 
circumstances are ineffective. The "ratification" provision of 
§ 57-1-22, UCA (1953) cannot validate the actions of one 
who does not timely file a written substitution of trustee. 
(Br. of Appellant at 15.) 
All of the conduct underlying Appellant's argument involves the action or inaction 
of parties other than U.S. Bank acting for the benefit of the Second-Position Lender. U.S. 
Bank held a first-position deed of trust with respect to the Property. (See R. at 23.) The 
alleged "oral substitution of trustee" that facilitated the trustee's sale was made with 
respect to the Second Mortgage and on behalf of the Second-Position Lender. (See R. at 
26 f 38.) The alleged failure to record a substitution of trustee simultaneously with the 
filing of the notice of default likewise involved the Second Mortgage and parties acting 
on behalf of the Second-Position Lender. (R. at 26 <[f 37; 28 f 47.) The later ratification 
that Appellant claims to be in conflict with the Statute of Frauds was made by the trustee 
acting on behalf of the Second-Position Lender. (R. at 76.) All of these actions were 
taken in furtherance of a foreclosure process conducted with respect to the Second 
Mortgage on behalf of the Second-Position Lender. None of them involved U.S. Bank. 
The various arguments presented in Appellant's brief fail to acknowledge that 
U.S. Bank never completed foreclosure proceedings against the subject property. Since 
the entire basis of Appellant's original action and her ongoing appeal is to potentially 
unwind or invalidate the trustee's sale held in culmination of the foreclosure process with 
respect to the Second Mortgage, it is unclear why U.S. Bank was ever included as a party 
in the first place. After all, while U.S. Bank did at one point initiate foreclosure 
10 
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proceedings, it never completed a trustee's sale because co-defendant/appellee Kemker 
Trust satisfied the U.S. Bank loan that had been secured by U.S. Bank's first-position 
deed of trust. (See R. at 482-83, 484 & 488.) Since U.S. Bank did not complete its 
foreclosure, any technical deficiencies in the foreclosure process would at most constitute 
harmless error, and the same in relationship to U.S. Bank are certainly beyond the scope 
of the issues preserved for this appeal by Appellant. The fact is that nothing about the 
transaction between U.S. Bank and co-defendant/appellee Kemker Trust has been called 
into question by any party. 
If the Court were to reverse the Dismissal Order based on the arguments contained 
in Appellant's brief, U.S. Bank would be forced once again to defend against a complaint 
to which it never should have been made a party. Even if there were procedural 
deficiencies in the foreclosure of the Second Mortgage under Utah law (which U.S. Bank 
disputes infra), those deficiencies did not involve conduct by or for the benefit of U.S. 
Bank. Furthermore, even if there were deficiencies in the foreclosure process initiated by 
U.S. Bank, such deficiencies would be of no moment, since U.S. Bank never completed a 
non-judicial foreclosure, meaning that there is no way that U.S. Bank could have harmed 
Appellant. 
Because the sum and substance of Appellant's brief centers on the conduct of 
parties other than U.S. Bank in furtherance of the interests of the Second-Position Lender, 
the decision of the District Court to dismiss U.S. Bank should not be overturned. 
11 
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C. U.S. BANK JOINS IN THE BRIEFING OF U.S. BANK'S CO-
DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO THE RATIFICATION AND 
CONFIRMATION OF PRIOR ACTS. 
To the extent deemed necessary or helpful by the Court, U.S. Bank expressly joins 
in and adopts the arguments of its co-defendants regarding the ratification and 
confirmation of prior acts of the substitute trustee, in accordance with the statutory 
scheme outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-22. The statutory interpretation proffered by 
Appellant would effectively nullify the statutory scheme devised by the Utah Legislature. 
Accordingly, U.S. Bank respectfully urges the Court to adopt the interpretation of the 
Second-Position Lender or the other co-defendants, and to find that any procedural 
deficiencies in the foreclosure process were cured by the statutorily sanctioned 
ratification of prior acts. 
VII. Conclusion 
For the reasons outlined above, U.S. Bank respectfully urges this Court to affirm 
the decision of the District Court dismissing U.S. Bank as a party. 
DATED this I ^ flay*of August, 2011. 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN 
H O L L I N G W O R T H J L M L L I A M S 
J^Fery S. Williams 
Jed K. Burton 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee U.S. Bank 
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